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A Reexamination of the Distinction between "Loss-Allocating" 
and "Conduct-Regulating Rules" 
Wendy Collins Perdue" 
The Louisiana choice of law code, drafted under the leadership of Dean 
Symeonides, is an important effort to codify the best of modem conflicts 
understanding. I routinely teach it to my conflicts students even though few will 
practice in Lo\lisiana. I think it quite possible that someday states that have 
followed more ad hoc judicial codifications1 may consider adopting the more 
systematic codification found in Louisiana. 
The basic philosophy underlying the Louisiana choice oflawcode is set forth 
in Louisiana Civil Code article 3515, which calls for the application of the laws of 
"the state whose policies would be most seriously impaired if its law were not 
applied to that issue. "2 The remainder of the codification is an effort to delineate 
how this general principle applies in different substantive areas. The starting point 
for building these specific rules is an understanding of the policies underlying the 
particular substantive area of law. The Louisiana choice of law code for torts3 
provides an excellent illustration of this approach. The tort rules also 
illustrate that a set of choice of law rules built around particular assumptions about 
the substantive law may not work as expected if those substantive assumptions 
prove incorrect. 
The Louisiana choice of law articles on torts4 incorporate a distinction, first 
developed in New Yorlc, s between tort rules that are conduct-regulating and those 
that are loss-allocating. The distinction has been described as "one of the few 
breakthroughs in modem American conflicts law.'o6 The basic rule is, as to laws 
that are conduct-regulating, to apply the law of the place of conduct, and, as to laws 
that are loss-allocating and the parties are from the same state, to apply the law of 
the common domicile. Dean Symeonides has succinctly explained the basic 
rationale behind the distinction: "most reasonable people can agree that conduct-
regulating rules are territorially oriented, whereas compensation and loss-
distributing rules usu~lly are not territorially oriented."7 This conflicts rule is built 
around the premise that there are two fundamental purposes of tort law-deterrence 
Copyright 2000, by LoUISIANA LAW REVIEW. 
• Associate Dean and Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. Professor Perdue 
co-authored a casebook on conflict oflaws with Dean Symeonides and Arthur von Mehren, see Conflict 
of Laws: American, Comparative, International (1998), and gratefully acknowledges all that Dean 
Symeonides has taught her about choice of law. She also thanks Lynn Stout and Carlos Vazquez for 
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1. See, e.g., Neumeier v. Kuehner, 286 N.E.2d 454, 457-58 (1972). 
2. La. Civ. Code. art. 3515. 
3. La. Civ. Code arts. 3542-3548. 
4. /d. 
5. See Schultz v. Boy Scouts of America, 480 N.E.2d 679 (N.Y. 1985). 
6. Symeon C. Symeonides, Louisiana's New Law of Choice of Law for Tort Conflicts: An 
Exegesis, 66 Tul. L. Rev. 677, 705 (1992). 
7. Id. at 703. 
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and compensation-and that all tort rules can meaningfully be classified as serving 
one of those two purposes.8 For example, the drafters of the code expected that 
rules such as caps on damages or immunity from suit would be treated as loss-
allocating and rules such as "rules of the road" would be treated as conduct 
regulating. 9 
In this paper, I disagree with the premise that all tort rules can be meaningfully 
classified as either compensatory or deterrent. I argue that most tort rules are both 
and that "the compensation and deterrence goals ascribed to the tort system cannot 
be separated. " 10 I then explore the impact on the Louisiana tort choice of law code 
of this alternative understanding of tort law. 
My analysis begins with the proposition that all tort rules are loss-allocating. 
A liability rule shifts the loss from the injured victim to the tortfeasor; conversely 
a rule of no liability means that the loss, no matter how real, will be borne by the 
victim. All tort rules determine who will bear a loss and thus all are loss-allocating. 
In addition to all tort rules being loss-allocating, I believe that most affect conduct. 
The reason is directly tied to loss-allocation. Loss-allocation creates incentives for 
those who must bear the loss to behave differently than they would if they did not 
bear the loss. To the extent people respond to incentives, tort rules will affect 
conduct. 11 As I note later in the paper, these effects on conduct may not always be 
intended by the lawmaker, and in particular situations, the conduct effect of two 
different rules may be quite small. Nonetheless, I believe there are few situations 
in which one can conclude that a tort rule is inherently loss-allocating but not 
conduct-regulating. 
The difficulties of classification have not gone unnoticed. Indeed, Dean 
Symeonides, with typical intellectual candor has acknowledged the problem12 
but has admonished that "difficulty . . . is no excuse for abandoning the 
judicial function." 13 However, if one accepts the view offered here that all 
tort rules allocate loss and thereby affect conduct, then the classification 
problem is not merely the result of insufficient diligence. The problem is more 
fundamental. 
The difficulties of classification can be illustrated with a brief examination of 
several different categories of tort rules with which the courts have struggled. 
These illustrations are not exhaustive but do highlight problems that are typical in 
this area. 
8. ld. 
9. Symeonides, supra note 6, at 699. 
10. See Michael Trebilock,/ncentive Issues inthe Design of"No-Fault" Compensation Systems 
39 U. Tor. L. J. 19, 20 (1989). 
11. There are two situations in which rules are certain to have no impact on conduct. The first 
is where the marginal demand for the conduct in question is inelastic. In this situation, people will 
engage in the conduct no matter what the cost or consequences. Punishing an addict for taking drugs 
is an example of this, though, of course, the punishment may have the effect of deterring others from 
becoming addicted. The second situation is where application of the rule is completely unpredictable. 
12. Symeonides, supra note 6, at 704. 
13. ld. at 705 (quotingJagers v. Royal1ndem. Co., 276 So. 2d 309,313 (La. 1973)). 
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Strict liability. One question on which the New York courts have split14 is 
whether a strict liability rule is conduct-regulating or loss-allocating. The court split 
is not surprising. Strict liability is a classic example of a tort rule that both allocates 
loss and affects conduct. Strict liability undeniably contains an element of 
insurance or loss-allocation. 15 Under a negligence standard, victims are insured 
against accidents that the defendant could have avoided with due care. Strict 
liability expands the insurance component and insures the victim against all 
accidents (including unavoidable ones). 16 Thus, strict liability is loss-allocating. 
But strict liability is also conduct-regulating. A negligence rule creates an incen-
tive for an actor to use due care. 17 A strict liability rule does not alter the incentives 
concerning the level of care, 18 but instead creates an incentive to reduce the 
level of an activity. 19 Consider, for example, a negligence versus a strict liability 
rule concerning the liability of employers for accidents on scaffolds. 20 Under both 
rules, the employer will have an incentive to take due care with respect to the 
scaffold, and we would not predict any greater level of care under one rule than the 
other. What would be different is that under a strict liability regime, we would 
predict that employers will use fewer scaffolds.21 Thus, in addition to 
allocating loss, a strict liability rule is likely to affect conduct, though not the level 
of care. 
Limits on damages. A second category of rules that are both loss-allocating 
and conduct-regulating are rules limiting damages. There are a variety oflaws that 
limit the amount or type of damage that can be recovered. Examples include: caps 
on pain and suffering, limits on wrongful death recoveries, and limits on what types 
of losses will be covered, e.g., loss of consortium. One might easily characterize 
these as loss-allocating since they obviously directly and explicitly determine how 
much a party must pay. But these rules have significant impact on conduct. From 
an economic perspective, it is the possibility of a damage award that causes an actor 
to internalize the costs its conduct imposes on others. The level of damages that an 
actor expects to pay directly affects the level of care the actor will take.22 A 
potential tortfeasor will take precautions so long as it is cheaper to take precautions 
than to pay the expected damage award. 23 If the damages are low, then the amount 
14. Compare Huston v. Hayden Bldg. Maintenance Corp., 617 N. Y.S.2d 335 (1994); Salsman 
v. Barden & Robeson Corp., 564 N.Y.S.2d 546 (1990), with Calla v. Shulsky, 543 N.Y.S.2d 666 (1989) 
and Aviles v. Port Auth., 615 N.Y.S.2d 668 (1994). 
15. See Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 179 (4th ed. 1992) [hereinafter Posner]. 
16. See William Landes & Richard Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law 66 (1987) 
[hereinafter Landes & Posner]. 
17. See Landes & Posner, supra note 16, at 64. 
18. See id. at 64-66; see also Posner, supra note 15, at 175. 
19. See Posner. supra note 15, at 176. 
20. This is what was at issue in the cases about which the New York courts have split. See supra 
note 14. 
21. See Posner's discussion of a similar situation involving the liability of railroads for fires 
caused by locomotive sparks, Posner, supra note 15, at 176-77. 
22. See Steven Shaven, Economic Analysis of Accident Law 127-28 (1987). 
23. See Posner, supra note 15, at 163-64. 
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spent to avoid those damages will also be low. Thus, although damages limits have 
an allocative effect, they also affect conduct. 
Immunity. A third category of rules that are both loss-allocating and conduct-
regulating are rules granting inununity to certain actors or for certain conduct. The 
New York Court of Appeals has held that inununity is loss-allocating.24 While it 
clearly is that, it is also conduct regulating. Immunity is simply the flip side of strict 
liability.25 Under strict liability, if a tortfeasor engages in particular conduct and 
harm results, that person is liable. The rule creates an incentive for the tortfeasor 
to reduce the amount of that risk-creating conduct. Immunity puts the risk ofloss 
entirely on the victim and thereby eliminates incentives for the tortfeasor to take 
care and creates incentives for the victim both to take due care and to take 
precautions to avoid the risk-creating activity. 26 
The immunity at issue in Schultz v. Boy Scouts of America was charitable 
inununity. Both economic theory and recent political debates suggest that immunity 
is conduct-regulating. The economic justification for charitable immunity is that 
it allows charities to externalize some of their costs as a way of increasing charitable 
sources. 27 It is conduct-regulating because it provides incentives for charities to 
increase the quantity of service provided. The conduct-regulating characteristic of 
charitable inununity is also apparent in the growing trend to provide inununity for 
volunteers within charitable organizations.28 A primary justification for these 
statutes is that concerns about liability were discouraging volunteer participation. 29 
Immunity is viewed as an incentive to encourage more people to volunteer with 
charitable organizations. 30 
States that have eliminated charitable inununity have concluded that the harm 
from negligent charities outweighs the benefit of more charities. It is not the case, 
however, as the dissenters imply in Schultz,31 that non-inununity is conduct-
regulating but immunity is not. Both inununity and non-inununity rules will affect 
conduct. States that grant and deny inununity may be focusing on different 
conduct. Immunity states may seek to increase charitable works while non-
immunity states may seek to decrease negligence. 32 Nonetheless, both rules affect 
conduct. 
24. Schultz v. Boy Scouts of America, 480 N.E.2d 679,686 (N.Y. 1985). 
25. See Landes & Posner, supra note 16, at 63 ("strict liability is symmetrical with no liability"). 
26. See Posner, supra note 15, at 178. 
27. See Landes & Posner, supra note 16, at 181 n.5 I; Note, The Quality of Mercy: "Charitable 
Torts·· and Their Continuing Immunity, 100 Harv. L Rev. 1382, 1395 (1987). 
28. See Charles Tremper, Compensation for Harm from Charitable Activity, 16 Cornell L. Rev. 
401, 412 (1991 ); Note, supra note 27, at 1386. 
29. See id. at 77. 
30. See David Hartman, Volunteer Immunity: Maintaining the Vitality of the Third Sector of Our 
Economy, 10 U. Bridg. L. Rev. 63 (1989). There is some anecdotal evidence that concerns about 
liability do in fact alter charitable activities. See Tremper, supra note 28, at 417. 
3 I. 480 N .E.2d at 691 (Jasen, J., dissenting). 
32. It is also possible that an immunity state is motivated entirely by a concern for loss-allocation 
and is either unaware of or indifferent to affects on conduct. This issue of motivation is addressed 
below. 
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Up to this point, I have argued that there are few, if any, tort rules that are 
inherently loss-allocating but not conduct-regulating. Nonetheless, there are three 
situations in which some tort rules can be said not to regulate conduct. The first is 
where, despite an actual or theoretical effect on conduct, the intent or purpose is 
entirely loss-allocating. If the goal of a choice of law rule is to implement the 
policies of the underlying law, focus on intent is entirely appropriate. But this 
technique will be helpful only where the purpose is uni-dimensional. Where the 
purpose is both loss-allocation and conduct-regulation, I do not believe there is any 
coherent methodology to determine which of multiple purposes is the more 
important or significant. 
An example of a rule with likely conduct effects but whose purpose may be 
solely loss-allocation is no-fault automobile insurance. No-fault automobile 
liability is generally justified as a form of insurance or loss-allocation. 33 There is 
a plausible theoretical argument that most no-fault plans affect conduct and reduce 
safety precautions34 and, indeed, there is also some empirical evidence to support 
this theory.35 Nonetheless, even if it is true that a particular no-fault scheme does 
in fact result in less safe driving, it is unlikely that this was the purpose of the law. 
Thus, suppose an accident occurred in a no-fault state that limited non-pecuniary 
recovery and the accident involved people from a state that did not limit recovery. 
One could conclude that the no-fault state was not trying to affect conduct (even if 
it did), and so its policies would not be impacted by the application of the law of the 
common domicile. 
In trying to ascertain underlying purposes, one might conclude that all laws 
which decrease the precautions taken by some people must always be loss-
allocating since no state would want to increase the risk of accidents. This 
conclusion would be incorrect. A decrease in one side's obligations to prevent 
ac::cidents puts the burden on the other party.36 For example, a rule that makes 
railroads liable for all fires caused by its trains puts the burden of prevention on the 
railroad. An alternative rule of no liability would put the burden entirely on 
surrounding land owners. A state might adopt the no-liability rule because it 
believed land owners were the most efficient accident a voiders. 37 Thus, by 
decreasing the obligations for railroads to take care, the rule increases the incentives 
for land owners to take care. There is no theoretical difference between the railroad 
law and the no-fault insurance plans. No-fault automobile liability plans could have 
the purpose of creating incentives for pedestrians to take care; the difference is 
33. See Robert Keeton & Jeffrey O'Connell, Basic Protection for the Traffic Victim 5 (1965). 
34. See Posner, supra note IS, at 205..()6; Trebilock, supra note 10, at 31-33. 
35. See Elisabeth Landes, Insurance, Liability, and Accidents: A Theoretical and Empirical 
Investigation of the Effect of No-fault Accidents, 25 J. Law & Econ. 49 (1982); Trebilock, supra note 
I 0, at 28-30. 
36. Similarly, as explained earlier, see text accompanying supra notes 18-20, strict liability 
provides an incentive to avoid the risk creating activity. Thus, a state might impose strict liability for 
scaffold accidents to encourage the use of alternatives to scaffolds. Conversely, a state might reject 
· strict liability for scaffolds because it does not want to encourage the use of scaffold alternatives which 
it might consider as unsafe or objectionable as scaffolds. 
37. SeePosner,supranote IS, at 176-78. 
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simply that, as an empirical matter, it does not seem plausible that this is the 
purpose behind no-fault plans. 
There is another important qualification on the use of intent or purpose-one 
cannot assume that because one state's purpose in adopting a rule is loss allocation, 
another state's purpose for adopting a different rule is also loss allocation. For 
example, even if we are confident that State A's no-fault system is intended to be 
loss-allocating, it does not follow that State B 's retention of a negligence system is 
not conduct-regulating. On the contrary, it is quite likely that a state would decline 
to adopt a no-fault system precisely because of concern about undesirable effects 
on conduct. 
Intent or purpose is likely to be inconclusive in many, if not most, cases, 
leaving many tort rules that can logically be classified as both loss-allocating and 
conduct-regulating. There is a second technique that may be used to eliminate some 
additional rule from the category of those that are conduct-regulating. This 
technique is a process of pragmatic evaluation and is built on the principle that, 
although in theory virtually all legal rules affect incentives and conduct, in practice 
the conduct effect of two different rules may be quite small. Under this approach, 
the court would make a pragmatic assessment of the likely real-world effects under 
the different rules that are arguably applicable. To be effective, it will be necessary 
to make a relatively particularized comparison. For example, while in some 
contexts the difference between a negligence rule and a gross negligence rule may 
significantly alter behavior, it may be unlikely to have that effect in the context of 
a guest ~tatute. First, a driver has an incentive to protect her own safety. s·econd, 
a driver will be liable to non-passengers for her ordinary negligence. The 
incremental additional incentive provided by the possibility of liability to 
passengers may be negligible. Thus, one could conclude that, as a practical matter, 
guest statutes are not conduct regulating. Of course in theory, guest statutes create 
incentive for prospective passengers to take greater care in their selection of drivers. 
One might conclude, nonetheless, that passenger behavior is unlikely to be much 
affected by the rule. 
As another illustration, one can do a pragmatic evaluation of contributory 
versus comparative negligence. Both contributory and comparative negligence are 
likely to have conduct effects when contrasted with a rule that puts no responsibility 
on the victim.38 However, when the choice is between these two versions of victim 
responsibility, a plausible argument can be made that the conduct-affecting 
difference between the two are negligible. As Richard Posner has explained, 
"comparative negligence has the same effects on safety as contributory 
negligence. "39 Any differences in conduct under the two systems will be subtle and 
tum on the effects on conduct of litigation uncertainty.40 In light of this, a court 
38. See Posner, supra note 15, at 169. 
39. See id. at 171. 
40. See id. at 172. Although one empirical study suggests that drivers take less care in 
comparative negligence states than in contributory negligence states, a court might conclude differently, 
at least as to other types of conduct; see Michelle White, An Empirical Test of the Comparative and 
Contributory Negligence Rules in Accident Law, 20 Rand J. Econ. 308 (1989). 
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might reasonably conclude that, from the point of view of conduct regulation, the 
differences between comparative and contributory negligence is slight and that the 
primary difference is in loss-allocation.41 
There are several limitations to this pragmatic approach. First, courts are 
unlikely to have empirical data and, therefore, the analysis is likely to be based on 
hunches and unquantifiable assumptions. Still, in some areas involving human 
motivation courts may be able to make a reasonable assessment. A second and 
greater risk is that courts will attempt an individualized assessment-would this 
defendant have behaved differently if the rule had been different? Such an in-
dividualized assessment is almost impossible to do in a meaningful way. Imagine 
a case of medical malpractice in which the doctor amputates the wrong leg. One 
could ask, "If this state permitted higher damage awards, would this doctor have 
amputated the correct leg?" Framed this way, the question is unanswerable. The 
doctor was surely not doing a cost-benefit calculation at the time she operated. The 
appropriate question is not an individualized inquiry but a marginal one.42 For 
example, if higher damages were allowed, insurance companies might insist on 
greater precautions or additional training. Higher damage awards might result in 
higher malpractice insurance for riskier procedures with the result that doctors 
would use lower risk procedures. We cannot know what would have happened in 
the particular case and should not try to determine that. Instead, the focus should 
be on determining whether a different rule would likely have resulted in different 
conduct or precautions being taken by some people impacted by the rule. 
A third situation in which tort rules may not be conduct-regulating is the classic 
Coase case43 in which the parties have an opportunity to bargain around the rule. 44 
In this situation, the legal rule may not. affect conduct but simply reallocate wealth. 4~ 
Such bargaining is unlikely in cases involving strangers, but may be possible where 
there is a prior or on-going relationship. Thus, application of a common domicile 
rule may be appropriate in some tort cases involving non-strangers. This principle 
could explain the result in Schultz, 46 where the tortfeasor and victim had a 
preexisting relationship. It would not justify applying the charitable immunity rule 
of a common domicile where the victims happened to be from the same state but 
had no relationship. 
As the foregoing analysis demonstrates, there may be some limited situations 
in which we can reasonably identify some tort rules as loss-allocating and not 
41. See Posner, supra note 15, at 172. In a case involving the choice between contributory and 
comparative negligence, the New York courts have held that these rules are loss-allocating. See Moon 
v. Plymouth Rock Corp., 693 N.Y.S.2d S09, 811 (1999); Armstead v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 
954F. Supp. 111, 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Murphyv. Acme Markets, Inc., 650F. Supp. 51,53 (E.D.N.Y. 
1986). In contrast, Dean Symeonides has argued that they are conduct-regulating. Symeon 
Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in I 999: One More Year, 48 Am. J. Comp. L. 143 
[text accompanying nn.33-43] (2000). 
42. See Trebilock, supra note I 0, at 31. 
43. See Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. Law & Econ. 1 (1960). 
44. See Posner, supra note 15, at 49-50. 
45. See Michael Polinsky, An Introduction to Law and Economics 12 (2d ed. 1989). 
46. Schultz v. Boy Scouts of America, 480 N.E.2d 679 (N.Y. 1985). 
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conduct-regulating. Nonetheless, it is likely that in many, if not most, situations 
this will not be possible. Obviously, this creates a problem for a choice of law rule 
that requires classification of all tort rules into one category or the other. Arbitrary 
labeling is one solution, but an unsatisfactory one. We could also abandon. 
completely the distinction, but it would then be necessary to substitute an alternative 
rule to guide choice of law in torts. A third option is to retain the distinction, use 
the methodology described above to identify some tort rules as loss-allocating, and 
treat all other rules as conduct-regulating. The practical effect o{ this may be to 
move to a largely territorial choice oflaw rule for torts since most tort rules would 
probably be treated as conduct regulating, but I don't view that as an inherently 
objectionable result. Indeed, this result is consistent with the standard economic 
view that the primary function of tort law is to provide incentives and deterrence for 
future behavior.47 Dean Symeonides has argued that "most reasonable people can 
agree that conduct-regulating rules are territorially oriented. "48 If one accepts this 
position and the standard economic view of torts as primarily conduct-regulating, 
then a largely territorial approach to choice oflaw is appropriate.49 
In this paper, I have examined the distinction between loss-allocating and 
conduct-regulating tort rules that is embodied in the Louisiana codification as well 
as in the judicial practice of other states. I have argued that this distinction is based 
on a particular view about tort law and have offered an alternative view, grounded 
in standard economic theory. I have attempted to show how this alternative view 
impacts on a conflicts rule that is built on the loss-allocating/conduct-regulating 
distinction. 
47. See Posner, supra note 15, at 202; Guido Calabresi, The Cost of Accidents 135 (1970). 
48. Symeonides, supra note 6, at 705. 
49. Interestingly, Judge Posner, one of the leaders of the law and economics movement, has 
asserted in a tort choice oflaw case that "(l]aw is largely territorial." Spinozzi v. ITI Sheraton Corp., 
174 F.3d 842, 846 (7th Cir. 1999). 
